Philosophical foundations of language in the law

List of Contributors . . ix

1. Introduction . . 1

2. The Value of Vagueness . . 14
   1. Introduction . . 14
   2. Legal instruments and legal standards . . 15
   3. Varieties of vagueness in legal instruments . . 17
   4. The guidance value and the process value of precision . . 19
   5. Arbitrariness and the normative principle . . 20
   6. The arbitrariness of precision . . 22
   7. Precision can be impossible . . 24
   8. Vague standards delegate power in ways that may comport with the purpose of the law . . 26
   9. Vague standards can encourage desirable forms of private ordering that achieve the law's purposes . . 27
   10. Summary . . 28
   11. Conclusion . . 29

3. What Vagueness and Inconsistency Tell Us about Interpretation . . 31
   1. Two kinds of vagueness . . 31
   2. Vagueness and the interpretation of legal, and non-legal, texts . . 33
   3. The value of vagueness . . 38
   4. Consequences for textualism . . 42
   5. Extending the lesson to the resolution of inconsistencies . . 44
   6. A note about legal positivism . . 51
   7. Purpose and normativity . . 52

4. Vagueness and the Guidance of Action . . 58
   1. Introduction . . 58
   2. State v Schaeffer . . 59
   3. The model of rules . . 62
   4. The model of standards . . 63
   5. Judgment and guidance . . 66
   6. Raz on authority . . 67
   7. Minimal guidance? . . 70
   8. Thick predicates . . 72
   9. Inchoate rules? . . 73
   10. Chilling behavior . . 75
   11. From traffic to torture . . 79
   12. The lesbian rule . . 81

5. Can the Law Imply More Than It Says? On Some Pragmatic Aspects of Strategic Speech . . 83
   1. The implied content of speech . . 84
   2. The normative framework of strategic speech . . 92
   3. Strategic speech in the law . . 96

6. Textualism and rhe Discovery of Rights . . 105
   1. Introduction . . 105
   2. Two models for discovering rights . . 112
   3. Cruel and unusual punishments . . 116
   4. Moral vision and constitutional interpretation . . 128
   5. Conclusion . . 129

7. Textualism, Intentionalism, and the Law of the Contract . . 130
   1. Jurisprudence as the science of legal effects . . 130
   2. A role for the philosophy of language . . 131
   3. Contract law and the law of the contract . . 134
   4. Gaps, default rules, and unenforceable provisions . . 135
   5. Textualism, hypothetical intentionalism, and the objective theory of contract . . 138
   6. Ambiguity . . 141
   7. Beyond ambiguity: Soper's Estate . . 147
   8. Personal meaning as the ground of contractual obligation . . 152
   9. An alternative account of'personal meaning' . . 157
   10. Skepticism about plain meaning . . 159
   11. Some conclusions . . 163

8. Modeling Legal Rules . . 165
   1. Introduction . . 165
   2. Particularism and rules . . 166
   3. That's it . . 167
   4. Distinguishing, overturning, and other legal actions . . 171
   5. Alternative I: Could legal rules be generics? . . 173
   6. Alternative II: Are legal rules governed by nonmonotonic logic? . . 176
   7. Conclusion . . 183

9. Trying to Kill the Dead: De Dicto and De Re Intention in Attempted Crimes . . 184
   1. Introduction . . 184
   2. Background: attempt, intention, and mens rea standards . . 187
   3. The solution . . 192
   4. Conclusion . . 216

10. Legislation as Communication? Legal Interpretation and the Study of Linguistic Communication . . 217
    1. Introduction . . 217
    2. Motivating the communication theory . . 221
    3. Refining the communication theory . . 226
    4. Raising doubts about the communication theory . . 233
    5. Different components and notions of communicative content . . 241
    6. Legislation and communication . . 250
    7. Conclusion . . 256

Bibliography . . 257
Legal Citations . . 265
Index . . 267